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DIALOGUE IN AN AGE OF ENCLOSURE: EXPLORING THE VALUES OF CULTURAL STUDIES NICK COULDRY
[paper submitted to the Review of Education/Pedagogy/Cultural Studies, September 2000] 'to exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it . . . Dialogue . . . must not be a situation where some men name on behalf of others.' Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972, 61-62) 'the real problem . . . is that people's questions are not answered by the existing distribution of the educational curriculum.' Raymond Williams, 'The future of cultural studies ' (1989a: 160) It is a platitude of educational reformers, on the right, the left and the old left which now claims the mantle of the new centre, that we live in a fast-changing world and education's duty is to prepare us for it. Less common is the insight that such 'change' is not definable apart from conflicts of value and therefore power, which a genuinely democratic practice of education must address. Education should not be reduced to training people to accommodate to other people's definitions of change; it must in Paulo Freire's sense be a dialogue. But it is precisely this vision of education that is currently under threat. 2 You can risk the whole authority of academic practice on the idea that it transcends questions of value. That was Max Weber's (1991 Weber's ( [1921 ) vision of sociology for a world which he saw as riven by irreconcilable conflicts of value; to mix science with values or politics was to fall into 'prophecy' or 'demagoguery'. Given the compromised racial politics of academic life in Germany in the early twentieth century, we cannot dismiss Weber's vision lightly. Alternatively, you can base a subject on the belief that at certain times it is precisely commitments of value that academics need to make, clearly and unequivocally. It is this 'political' conception of education and intellectual work that has characterised cultural studies. In this article, I
want to do two things: to explore what the underlying values of cultural studies are, and to illustrate why they matter particularly in the current state of educational politics, in Britain and perhaps elsewhere.
In exploring the distinctive values of cultural studies, a useful reference-point remains the vision of Raymond Williams, developed in Britain principally in the 1950s and 1960s. The position is complicated, because, since Williams' early writings, all questions of value in intellectual work have undergone a fundamental displacement: a decentreing of the very basis on which intellectual and scientific authority is claimed or assumed. What was primarily a conversation within the ambit of 'the West' and within a largely unquestioned patriarchal and racially specific authority must now be a conversation that is decentred, open-ended, and global. And yet a fundamental principle that Williams articulated was dialogue and an interrogation of power's investments in cultural value. So we need, not to jettison Williams' work, but to isolate its key principles and explore how they resonate with work done in other places and times. It was in a similar spirit, I believe, that Edward Said (1978: 28) Whatever its limitations, Williams' work kept worrying away at an essential but deceptively simple question: why does it matter that we study 'our' culture, 'ordinary' culture (Williams, 1989b) and how best can we do it within an institutional framework? This breaks down into a number of specific questions: • what are the conditions of a 'common culture' (Williams, 1958: 305) and what values underpin them?
These are, by definition, public questions, part of a wider dialogue. Putting them at the heart of the academic study of culture is the starting-point of cultural studies as a discipline. Unfortunately, for us as for Williams, this orientation puts cultural studies at odds with the prevailing educational logics of the day.
In the first section, I will explore what Williams meant by the 'ordinariness' of culture, and show the parallels with approaches to culture developed elsewhere: in 4 Kenya (the work of Ngugi wa Thiong'o) and in Colombia (the work of Jesus MartinBarbero). In the second section I discuss some of the limitations of Williams' vision and how it must be transposed, if it is to remain a useful reference-point for contemporary cultural politics. This transposition is all the more vital, I argue in the third section, given the threat to educational dialogue from its reduction to commerce; as an example, I discuss the inadequate concept of education of even a relatively sympathetic institutional reformer, Charles Leadbeater, a leading adviser to Tony Blair's New Labour government in Britain.
I then attempt to draw together the principles common to various visions of cultural studies, before reflecting in the conclusion on the connections between such abstract principles and practical pedagogy and citizenship.
The Ordinariness of Culture
'Culture is ordinary', Raymond Williams famously wrote. His point was not to replace a notion of culture (as specific, legitimated works) with a looser notion of culture as life process, but to hold both notions of culture in tension. Instead of seeing the artistic work (such as the nineteenth century English novel) in the abstract, Williams insisted on thinking about how it emerged from a much broader range of cultural practice, what he called a 'cultural formation', a shared practice of making meanings involving everyone in a particular culture.
These connections are brought out in the following passage from an essay originally published in 1958: 5 Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expressed these, in institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions . . . The growing society is there, yet it is also made and remade in every individual mind. . . . A culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new observances and meanings, which are offered and tested. These are the ordinary processes of human societies and human minds, and we see through them the nature of a culture: that is always both traditional and creative; that it is both the most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings. We use the word culture in these two senses: to mean a whole way of life -the common meanings; to mean the arts and leaning -the special processes of discovery and creative effort. Some writers reserve the word for one or other of these senses; I insist on both, and on the significance of their conjunction. The questions I ask about our culture are questions about our general and common purposes, yet also questions about deep personal meanings. Culture is ordinary, in every society and in every mind. (1989b: 4, added emphasis) I have quoted this at length because it shows the direction of Williams' argument, and its originality, very clearly. As the highlighted passage brings out, it is the complex interrelation of 'textual' and 'anthropological' approaches to culture that was important to him.
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This had two major advantages: it avoided abstracting cultural analysis from an analysis of the shared living conditions of that culture's time; and it introduced a necessary distance from the value judgements about cultural production (present and historical) which happen to prevail at any particular time. The second advantage is that cultural analysis (as so conceived) apply just as appropriately to any work, whether 'high' or 'low': there is no question of 'high' culture being more worth investigating from this point of view. As Williams once put it: 'our real purpose should be to bring all cultural work within the same world of discourse ' (1968: 133) .
It is easy to take this latter point for granted given four decades of cultural studies practice, so it is worth remembering how different Williams' vision was from conventional analyses of culture at that time. The distinguished American sociologist, Edward Shils, for example, commented in 1961, as if it were plain fact, that:
[there are] three levels of culture, which are levels of quality measured by aesthetic, intellectual and moral standards. These are 'superior' or 'refined ' culture, 'mediocre' culture, and 'brutal culture'. (1961: 4, quoted in Tudor, 1995: 88-9) Can we really deny that a similar division is at work even now in the structuring of higher education and in press attacks (very common in Britain at least) on the status of media and cultural studies? Raymond Williams' point remains a radical one.
It is worth spelling out some further implications. The first is that Williams is not simply arguing that we pay more attention to 'popular' culture at the expense of elite culture. To do that would simply invert the high/low hierarchy without challenging it. 7 Instead Williams is arguing for a common culture: a shared culture based on what he calls a 'recognition of practical equality' between its members (1958: 305) . Putting that into practice means a lot more than just avoiding judgements about cultural production you don't like much. It means positively valuing everyone's common experience in a shared culture, treating everyone's experience of culture as valuable (1958: 306) . It was this sense of valuing each other that was missing, according to Williams, in 1950s Britain: an effective community of experience . . . depends on a recognition of practical equality . . . We lack a genuinely common experience, save in certain rare and dangerous moments of crisis. What we are paying for this lack . . . is now sufficiently evident. We need a common culture, not for the sake of an abstraction, but because we shall not survive without it. (Goldman, 1995: 291-2) The vision of culture as 'ordinary' was the result of a sustained social debate and teaching practice in Britain lasting more than half a century. I return to this point in my conclusion.
There are also striking parallels between Williams' cultural theory and work Language as culture is the collective memory bank of a people's experience in history. (Ngugi, 1986: 14-15) These values are reflected both in a way of life and in specific works, whether of the oral or written traditions. Ngugi's notion of culture was specifically an attempt to think about his own language and culture (Gikuyu) that the British had set out to destroy by imposing an English-language based education system and literary culture 1986: 3) 11
Articulating the grounds of a common culture was, for Ngugi (1986: 103) as for
Williams, a matter of democracy, but in conditions -of conflict with a dominant outside culture -very different from those Williams envisaged.
Another interesting parallel for the notion of culture as 'ordinary' is Latin American work on popular culture, for example that of the Colombian media theorist Jesus Martin-Barbero (1993) . Here the context is not, as with Ngugi, the early stages of a post-colonial regime, but rather the long-term consequences of the Spanish Conquest:
the complex process of forging national unity in Latin American nations which are complex amalgams of indigenous, European, and mixed (mestizaje) populations, with enormous variations of literacy and material wealth (Rowe and Schelling, 1990) .
Like Ngugi, Martin-Barbero is well aware of the work of British cultural studies along with many other sources for studying the popular (history, anthropology, sociology), but, again, to trace a British 'origin' for his work is misleading. What matters is that in the particular Latin American postcolonial context a broad notion of popular culture, parallel to Williams' concept of 'common culture', was necessary. As MartinBarbero explains:
We are not dealing with an increase of information about popular culture in terms of statistics and factual data, but rather with a process that relocates the 'place' of the popular by incorporating it into the constitutive memory of the flow of history . . . this has begun to fragment the once monolithic concept of culture both at the level of the semantic universe and at the pragmatic level.
( Martin-Barbero, 1993: 62) 12
Instead of a limited range of texts, culture had to be seen as a mass of social processes operating at many levels, in all its 'ordinary' local complexity.
Extending the Values of Cultural Studies
Parallels are important -they show that cultural studies can be seen as a coherent, but de-centred subject, not one whose narratives must retrace a Eurocentric, colonial trajectory (Wright, 1998 ) -but they are not enough. A radical transposition of the terms of Williams' vision is necessary, if we are to address today's cultural politics.
The limitations of Williams' work have frequently been noted. First, its referencepoints in a sense of purely local practice, inspired by the Welsh working-class community of his youth which, even when he wrote, was largely a nostalgic vision, 2 and quite inadequate to the actual cultural complexity of 1950s Britain (Gilroy, 1987: 49-50), let alone the implications of Britain's colonial past (Said, 1990: 83) . To be fair, Williams' notion of social identity and community was not completely closed, since he emphasised the need to convert a defensive solidarity into an acceptance of 'extending community ' (1958: 319) . But this extension of community was imagined by Williams largely in terms of class; the conflictual terrain of ethnicity was not integrated into his thinking.
Another limitation is, as Williams later admitted (1979: 148-9) , that his notion of community and of culture did not recognise gender inequalities, and how these are 13 structured into the very organisation of cultural production. The need to correct for this is now so obvious that I will not discuss it further here. Instead, what cultural studies must address is something more like the experience of exile in time and space, a 'homebound quest in an offbeat temporality ' (1993: xiii) .
Such prophetic criticism is critical of the surrounding culture at a fundamental level, challenging the very category of 'race' and asking how 'race' is embedded in discursive and cultural hierarchies (cf Gates, 1986; Gilroy, 2000 (Smith, 1997: 188, 192) The 'necessity of creating a new culture' (Mercer, 1994: 3, quoting Before formulating these values more fully -they lie at the heart of cultural studieswe need to appreciate some of the political context which makes this project, for all its difficulties, so urgent.
Empty Radicalism: Education Without Dialogue
What the different inflections of cultural studies I have discussed all share is a sense that education is more than the transmission of the already known. ' (2000: 11) was in some ways the justificatory 'bible' for which Blair's uneasy combination of globalizing and communitarian rhetoric had been waiting. Indeed, the attention it received partly reflected the fact that until then it was precisely an articulated vision that Blair's politics lacked (Marr, 1999 Bourdieu, the concern with 'reinventing public services' (Bourdieu, 1998: 27) . What I want to show, however, is that when, briefly, Leadbeater deals with education, his presumptions are incoherent, precisely because they fail to move beyond the 'autocratic technocracy' which Bourdieu insists we must challenge. Leadbeater, in other words, lacks any sense of education, except one prefigured by the economy and its power structures.
If there were more space, I could connect this weakness with other weaknesses in Leadbeater's argument: his inadequate attention to the human costs of workplace instability (Sennett, 1999) principal benefit is that it is more closely tailored to economic conditions.
Leadbeater hardly discusses educational content at all, so we are left to assume that the content which matters most in his scheme of things is that which most effectively services the economy. Without ever being explicit, Leadbeater's book, by its absences more than by its inclusions, reproduces a notion of education as mere training, 4 as 'kit', in a currently fashionable English term, for economic performance. There is no place at all for any broader notion of education's purpose, including its links with democratic debate.
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This reduced notion of education as training is increasingly common and frequently elided with a notion of 'liberated' consumerism. So, for example, the director of the Education Counselling Service (an arm of the British Council) was recently quoted as saying, without qualification, that 'education is becoming a consumer good, and people will exercise the same kind of parameters in making their decisions as they do for anything else'; and a new report of the central policy making body in British higher education (the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals) predicted a shift to a 'a customer-focussed approach to education and learning'. This is not the old distance learning, but online classroom interaction. Consumers can choose when to start and when to stop. . . They can choose the tutors, the topics, the terms. They are savvy purchasers who may want the learning so that they can do the earning or they may buy the product simply for its pleasure or leisure value.
Even if education's effects cannot immediately be translated into economic activity, the deferred economic benefit needs to be assured. So Umberto Eco, announcing the opening of his Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici in Bologna, anticipated students' and journalists' questions thus:
What we say to our students in communication studies is, 'do not ask us what this degree will be useful for -between the time you enrol and when you leave so 22 many things will have happened that you will know what to invent while we won't'. (quoted, Times Higher Education Supplement, 4 February, 2000, 10) In this approach to education, there is a 'subtle conflation of the distinctive values of education with those of training' (Taylor, 2000) . Modernisation is merely the guise of a thorough-going marketisation (Rustin, 1998: 99) .
It is this economically driven 'vision' that dominates British government thinking on education and which Leadbeater has helped further entrench. Yet there is a void at its heart. As Henry Giroux has eloquently argued with the American case particularly in mind, but it applies equally to Britain: 'knowledge becomes capital -a form of investment in the economy -but appears to have little value when linked to the power of self-definition or the capacities of individuals to expand the scope of freedom' (2000b: 8) . None of this is surprising for a Blair government that has swallowed whole the rhetoric of the 'information society', and announced its own 'Information Society Initiative'. But it is a concern that even relatively progressive social visions of public institutional reform within British government circles are blind to how marketization is distorting the very frame of educational debate.
To counter this, we need, like Leadbeater, to focus on the social values that underlie education and citizenship, but on rather different ones.
Towards Common Ground?
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If the values which underpin cultural studies are under threat, it is all the more important to state them clearly. I want to set out five values, which, taken together, represent common ground on which cultural studies can stand, or fall, as a discipline. Cultural studies has to be a space for both speaking and listening. This second principle is often forgotten, but it is crucial. As the postcolonialist critic Gayatri Spivak has put it: 'for me, ''Who should speak?'' is less crucial than '''Who will listen? ''' ( : 59, quoted in Mercer, 1994 . This applies to politics, to academic writing, and to teaching. The classroom itself needs to be a space where each person can be confident that their voice will be recognised and valued (hooks, 1994: 186 ).
Yet the practice of listening -of bearing witness (hooks, 1991: 133) Cultural studies, however, should involve not only dialogue, but also reflexivity (this is the third principle), including reflection about the means through which all the voices in that dialogue have been formed, and the conditions which have produced the 25 space of cultural studies itself. That means reflecting both on ourselves and on the culture around us: does, for instance, that culture satisfy the principles of cultural democracy, which the first two principles encapsulate? Critical reflection on shared culture, of course, carries risks: of being misunderstood as elitist or unconstructive.
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The risk is unavoidable, but in taking it we must, as John Frow (1995) has argued, be fully self-reflexive about the institutional power which enables us to be publicly critical. Cultural studies is the work of critical intellectuals; it is not itself part of the popular domain which it discusses, and implying otherwise is bad faith.
If such reflexivity is to be effective, it must be theoretically adequate to what it reflects upon. In looking at how voices and cultures are formed, it must adopt a materialist perspective (the fourth principle). Cultural phenomena -and this is a common thread throughout the history of cultural studies, wherever it has been practised -are always material processes, which are far from transparent. Only through open dialogue, which is committed to applying these principles, which leads to the fifth and final principle. Quite simply, the first four principles have to be actively defended through the work of cultural studies itself. There is no automatic consensus in their favour. Cultural democracy, for which they are necessary conditions, is not a 'natural' state, even if we can argue for it on rational grounds. If it is to be more than fine ambition, cultural studies must be an empowering practice, a practice which acts directly upon the conditions of culture to change them.
Cultural studies, in whatever capacity we practise it -as teacher, student, advocate, or critic -involves an enduring ethical commitment which is no more reducible to shortterm consumption choices than are the values of democracy itself. In both cases, there are, of course, powerful forces ranged to convince us otherwise, for the enclosure of education for economically defined ends is one aspect of the impoverishment of democracy itself.
Conclusion: Learning (and Teaching) from Experience
Cultural studies' values must be translated into how we pass on the subject to students and beyond them to the wider culture, especially in a commercialised culture which is hostile to those values. In this article, I have tried to radicalise Raymond Williams'
vision of cultural studies' values and put it into dialogue with visions from other times and places, but in concluding I want to recall that Williams was concerned also with 27 the practical question of how to teach culture in modern societies and his writings on this still resonate today.
Important to the British adult education movement in which Williams participated was the principle that education is central to democracy, and must be responsive to the life experiences of those it teaches. Williams' explicit aim in the writings and teaching that later emerged as cultural studies was 'the creation of an educated and participating democracy ' (1993a [1961] : 223). He saw democratic principles extending into the classroom:
Popular education in any worthwhile sense begins from a conception of human beings which . . . insists that no man can judge for another man [sic] , that every man has a right to the facts and skills on which real judgement is based, that, in this sense, all education depends on the acknowledgement of an ultimate human equality. (Williams, 1993b (Williams, [1959 This vision remains important today, for example, in the work of the educational and cultural theorist Henry Giroux.
Giroux, like many writers discussed in this article, has developed his approach to cultural studies in response to a crisis, a crisis in educational and cultural authority in contemporary multicultural America as a whole:
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The emergence of the electronic media coupled with a diminishing faith in the power of human agency has undermined the traditional visions of schooling and the meaning of pedagogy. (Giroux, 1996: 73) Unlike authoritarian attacks on American cultural collapse, Giroux is concerned to understand the real changes in the conditions under which young people now make sense of the culture they live in ( There are, of course, many ways of finding a voice, and academic education connects with just one of them. But, as an academic practice, cultural studies is unique in that it 29 treats the process of finding a voice as part of what it studies (Couldry, 2000, chapter 6 ). This involves, of course, teachable skills, but it is not reducible to 'training', unless we mean training to be active and critical participants in the surrounding culture, training for citizenship. Citizenship, if it is to be more than empty formalism, requires an engagement with the claims of others, with questions of justice. But, as the political philosopher Seyla Benhabib (1992) argues, justice requires always an engagement with 'the concrete other', not merely an abstract, generalised other. For justice and therefore for an adequate notion of citizenship, there must be a commitment to dialogue with concrete others. 8 If we take seriously the material constraints on others, indeed oneself, entering into dialogue and acquiring a voice, then cultural studies' reflexive work becomes part of the dialogue integral to contemporary citizenship as a whole.
Cultural studies should not just study, but embody, the conditions for new forms of democratic political exchange, 'restoring the language of ethics, agency, power and identity' (Giroux, 1996: 53) . This is the true moving force of cultural studies as a discipline. 9 That means, always, listening to the experiences of others. Raymond
Williams, in a letter written at the end of his work for the WEA, reflected in these terms:
The tutor . . . may not know the gaps between academic thinking and actual experience among many people; he [the tutor, as opposed to the student] may not know when, in the pressure of experience, a new discipline has to be created.
(1993a [1961] : 224).
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Cultural studies was that new discipline, and yet we are a long way from achieving, anywhere, the participatory culture for which Williams hoped. Worse, cultural studies must now defend its values against prevailing educational discourses which would deny the very space of dialogue on which Williams' vision relied.
Ironically -but a hidden irony, that we must insist others confront -it is a commodified culture, whose categorical imperative is flexibility and the embracing of ceaseless change, that denies the space for making the one change that would matter:
the construction of a common culture, a space for hearing each others' questions about how we belong, with no guarantee of answers. If cultural studies matters, it is because it still values the possibility of such a space.
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